# Recent approaches towards speaker anonymization

### Brij Mohan Lal Srivastava

PhD student at INRIA

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#### Outline

- 1. Objectives and Roadmap
- 2. Anonymization via Adversarial Representation Learning
- 3. Anonymization via X-vector based Voice Conversion
- 4. Conclusion

#### Speaker recognition = Biometric identification

- Non-invasive / without contact
- **Distinctive** and **replicable** templates can be generated (x-vectors).
- Speaker identification and verification/authentication error rates are close to zero : X-vector + PLDA yields 2-3% error rate (*Garcia-Romero et al. 2019*)
- Increasing privacy threats require more research on speaker anonymization.

#### Two objectives of anonymization

- (Privacy) Data shared by the speaker cannot be linked back to the speaker.
  - Amount of privacy protection must be reported in all possible attack scenarios.
  - All attributes of speaker's identity such as speaking rate, timbre, emotional traits, health conditions, etc. must be handled.
- (Utility) Anonymization should not affect the utility of speech, e.g. linguistic variability and content.
  - Output must be usable for further processing, e.g. pitch extraction, phonetic analysis, etc.
  - Output must be intelligible and suitable for annotation and training of automatic speech recognition (ASR) systems.



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#### Adversarial anonymization

- The Adversary neural network (red) tries to learn relevant speaker-specific features
- Provides feedback to Encoder network scaled by a parameter (α) which decides the strength of anonymization



#### Attacker scenarios - evaluation schemes



## Closed-set identification

Inside the adversarial ASR



X-Vector based Speaker Verification

#### Results (open vs closed set)

	Raw speech	Blue branch only	Adversarial Learning
Word Error Rate (ASR)		9.40	11.30 👚
Classification Error (closed)	2.78	51.37 👚	94.40 眷
Equal Error Rate (open)	4.31	24.77 👚	25.97 👚

- WER increases slightly indicating bearable utility loss.
- Speaker classification error (closed-set) increases significantly = significant privacy gain.
- Speaker verification error only increases slightly = insignificant privacy gain

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#### Voice Conversion vs Voice Transformation



Adversarial Learning (VT technique) because we define what we **do not** want. In VC we define what we **do** want.

#### Voice Privacy Challenge

The challenge is to develop anonymization solutions which suppress personally identifiable information contained within speech signals.

Using freely available datasets.

https://www.voiceprivacychallenge.org/

Baseline recipe available at:

https://github.com/Voice-Privacy-Challenge/Voice-Privacy-Challenge-2020

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#### Threat model

Actors:

- 1. Speaker
- 2. Attacker
- 3. User



#### X-vectors

- Behind the state-of-the-art biometric identification techniques
- Fixed length vector to represent an utterance regardless of duration.
- Intermediate layer of a neural network trained to classify speaker



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#### X-vector based speaker anonymization framework



How to optimally select target speakers from a small pool of speakers? (Speaker's Perspective)



#### **Privacy** Evaluation - Attackers



#### **Utility** Evaluation



#### Proximity (Privacy)



#### Baseline = 0.86

Mapping in DENSE region can be considered as "losing your identity in the crowd".

#### User's perspective

Is the resulting speech corpus suitable for downstream tasks?

Preserve speech quality in terms of naturalness and intelligibility

• Measured using viability to train ASR models

#### Informed ASR (Proximity: DENSE)

X-Y = Decoding X using ASR trained on Y

O = Original A = Anonymized



#### Attacker's Questions

- Does the information about anonymization help discover the speaker's identity? How to use this information?
- 2. How to optimize the search space using side-information to efficiently discover the speaker's identity?

#### Informed ASV (Proximity: DENSE)



#### Conclusion

- 1. Adversarial Training effectively removes speaker's information in a closet-set but does not generalizes to open-set speakers.
- 2. During Voice Conversion, mapping the "target speaker" in **dense** region with **random** gender selection produces *state-of-the-art* speaker anonymization.
- 3. The resulting speech corpus can be utilised for tasks such as: training an ASR model.
- 4. X-vector based target selection proves to be robust against "Semi-Ignorant" and "Semi-Informed" attacks.

#### Thanks for your attention!

More details on :

https://brijmohan.github.io/

Email : brij.srivastava@inria.fr

