Evaluating Voice Conversion based Privacy Protection against Informed Attackers

Brij Mohan Lal Srivastava, Nathalie Vauquier, Md Sahidullah, Aurélien Bellet, Marc Tommasi and Emmanuel Vincent

Context

  • Distinguishable and Repeatable biometric references can be extracted from speech
  • Speech processing raises privacy threats
  • Anonymization ensures that original speaker cannot be linked to the published anonymized dataset
  • The anonymized data must be fit for use in downstream tasks

Contributions

  • Compare 3 anonymization methods based on voice conversion
  • Definition of target voice selection strategies
  • Characterization of attacker’s knowledge about the anonymization scheme
  • Evaluation of privacy and utility

Threat model


Voice conversion based anonymization


Voice conversion

  • Logical speaker anonymization framework
    • Convert source speaker’s voice to a target speaker
    • Conversion may not be perfect, residual source speaker info might be present
    • Choice of target speaker is critical for strength of anonymization
  • Allows data publication
  • First proposed in 2009 [2], many techniques proposed thereafter

VC methods: criteria

  1. Non-parallel
  2. Many-to-many
  3. Source/language independent

Three VC methods

  1. VoiceMask: simple frequency warping based on composition of two functions $B$ and $Q$: $ f’ = B(Q(f, \alpha), \beta) $
  2. Vocal Tract Length Normalization: learn transformation parameters between source and target class spectra
  3. Disentangled Speech Representation: separate encoders for content (instance normalization) and speaker (average pooling) information

Anonymization Model


Anonymization framework


Target selection strategies


Design of Attackers


Ignorant attacker


Semi-Informed attacker


Informed attacker


Experiments


Training data


Evaluation data

MaleFemale
#Speakers1316
Genuine trials449548
Impostor trials945711,196

Evaluation protocol

  • Attackers are simulated using speaker verification, which produce PLDA scores
  • Measure of privacy: Equal Error Rate (EER) computed using PLDA scores
  • Measure of utility: Word Error Rate (WER)

Results


Results on privacy (EER)


PLDA score distribution

  • More overlap between the score distributions ensures more privacy
  • Overlap decreases as we move from Ignorant to Informed attacker

Results on utility (WER)


Conclusion

  • Investigated VC algorithms for speaker anonymization
  • Target selection and attacker’s knowledge are critical for strength of anonymization
  • Simple methods can provide reasonable protection