Evaluating Voice Conversion based Privacy Protection against Informed Attackers
Brij Mohan Lal Srivastava, Nathalie Vauquier, Md Sahidullah, Aurélien Bellet, Marc Tommasi and Emmanuel Vincent
Context
- Distinguishable and Repeatable biometric references can be extracted from speech
- Speech processing raises privacy threats
- Anonymization ensures that original speaker cannot be linked to the published anonymized dataset
- The anonymized data must be fit for use in downstream tasks
Contributions
- Compare 3 anonymization methods based on voice conversion
- Definition of target voice selection strategies
- Characterization of attacker’s knowledge about the anonymization scheme
- Evaluation of privacy and utility
Threat model
Voice conversion based anonymization
Voice conversion
- Logical speaker anonymization framework
- Convert source speaker’s voice to a target speaker
- Conversion may not be perfect, residual source speaker info might be present
- Choice of target speaker is critical for strength of anonymization
- Allows data publication
- First proposed in 2009 [2], many techniques proposed thereafter
VC methods: criteria
- Non-parallel
- Many-to-many
- Source/language independent
Three VC methods
- VoiceMask: simple frequency warping based on composition of two functions $B$ and $Q$: $ f’ = B(Q(f, \alpha), \beta) $
- Vocal Tract Length Normalization: learn transformation parameters between source and target class spectra
- Disentangled Speech Representation: separate encoders for content (instance normalization) and speaker (average pooling) information
Anonymization Model
Anonymization framework
Target selection strategies
Design of Attackers
Ignorant attacker
Experiments
Training data
Evaluation data
| Male | Female |
|---|
| #Speakers | 13 | 16 |
| Genuine trials | 449 | 548 |
| Impostor trials | 9457 | 11,196 |
Evaluation protocol
- Attackers are simulated using speaker verification, which produce PLDA scores
- Measure of privacy: Equal Error Rate (EER) computed using PLDA scores
- Measure of utility: Word Error Rate (WER)
Results
Results on privacy (EER)
PLDA score distribution
- More overlap between the score distributions ensures more privacy
- Overlap decreases as we move from Ignorant to Informed attacker
Results on utility (WER)
Conclusion
- Investigated VC algorithms for speaker anonymization
- Target selection and attacker’s knowledge are critical for strength of anonymization
- Simple methods can provide reasonable protection